Demand for Visitation to U.S. National Park Areas: Entrance Fees and Individual Area Attributes by Ngure, Njoroge & Chapman, Duane
WP99-25 
October 1999 
..
 
Working Paper 
Department of Agricultural, Resource, and Managerial Economics 
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853-7801 USA 
Demand for Visitation to U.S. National Park 
Areas: Entrance Fees and Individual Area 
Attributes 
Authors:	 Njoroge Ngure
 
Duane Cbapman
 • 
..
 
It is the Policy of Cornell University actively to support equality 
of educational and employment opportunity. No person shall be 
denied admission to any educational program or activity or be 
denied employment on the basis of any legally prohibited 
discrimination involving, but not limited to, such factors as race, 
color, creed, religion, national or ethnic origin, sex, age or 
handicap. The University is committed to the maintenance of 
affirmative action programs which will assure the continuation of 
such equality of opportunity. 
.. 
.. 
-
Demand for Visitation to U.S. National Park Areas: Entrance Fees and
 
Individual Area Attributes
 
Njoroge Ngure
 
Duane Chapman
 
Department of Agricultural, Resource, and Managerial Economics
 
Cornell University
 
Ithaca, NY, USA
 
Running Head: National Park Area Visitation 
Key Words: Demand, Visitation, U.S. National Park Areas, Entrance Fees, Area 
Attributes 
Abstract 
We examine the effects of entrance .fees and other factors in visitation to U.S. 
national park areas under two partially competing hypotheses: 1) fees are 
significant explanatory variables; and 2) individual area attributes are the primary 
determinants of visitation rates. (National park areas include natural protected 
areas, historic areas, and other categories in the national park system). We find 
that areas comprising natural protected areas behaved like economic substitutes 
for each other, and historic areas like economic complements. In addition, the 
results have confirmed the importance of individual park attributes in visitation, 
but are equivocal on the role of entrance fees. The role of other socio-economic 
variables and of park size is also analyzed. 
Introduction 
The effects of entrance fees on visitation to U.S. national parks has been 
a subject of intense debate since automobile parking fees were introduced to Mt. 
Rainer National Park in 1908 (Mackintosh 1983). This debate is linked to a 
popular American view that people who cannot pay should not be denied access 
-
to national parks, a view that has apparently encouraged Congress to maintain 
control over the entrance fee program. In October 1995, however, Congress 
initiated a Fee Demonstration Program (FDP) which authorized the National Park 
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Service (NPS), the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Land Management 
and the Forest Service to change fees in the federal lands they control, and to 
report the effects of the new fees on visitation (Public Law 104-134). 
Prior to the FDP, most of the debate on entrance fees was not guided by 
informed analysis. In addition, initial studies conducted under the FDP have 
concentrated on visitor attitude towards the fees, and this may not accurately 
reflect the response by the general public (Lundgren et. al. 1997; Lundgren and 
Lime 1997; U.S. National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, and Bureau of 
Land Management 1998). In this paper we use an econometric approach to 
determine the effects of entrance fees on visitation, and to contribute to the 
perennial debate on their desirability (see for example U.S. National Park Service 
1939, 1986 and numerous Congressional hearings on the subject). We begin by 
describing the data and clarifying some important terminology. 
The U.S. National Park System consists of areas and property managed 
by the NPS. By 1998 there were about 376 such areas, which included areas of 
historic, natural, scientific, educational, recreational, and aesthetic importance. 
The.se areas are commonly called "national parks", but they are more properly 
referred to as "national park areas". The NPS classifies the national park areas 
into 20 categories, 19 of which have most of the included areas reporting data on 
visitation (Table 1). Category 11 may be confusing because it is also called 
"national parks". It includes most natural protected areas, which are 
distinguished by their focus on the preservation of natural landscapes of 
biological and aesthetic importance. This category also matches the 
international definition of the term "national park" (I.U.C.N. 1990). 
-

From this point we use the term "national park" to refer to category 11. 
Likewise, we reserve the phrase "national park area" when there is no need to 
distinguish an area's category. Whenever we use the term "park" alone, we 
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Table 1. Categories of U.S. National Park Areas 
Name Number of Parks 
Administered Reporting Visits 
1. International historic site 1 0 
2. National battlefields 11 10 
3. National battlefield parks 3 3 
4. National battlefield sites 1 0 
5. National historic sites 74 67 
6. National historic parks 38 32 
7. National lakeshores 4 4 
8. National memorials 27 26 
9. National military parks 9 9 
10. National monuments 73 69 
11. National parks 54 52 
12. National parkways 4 4 
13. National preserve 16 10 
14. National reserves 2 18 
15. National recreation areas 19 1 
16. National rivers 6 4 
17. National scenic trails 3 0 
18. National wild and scenic Rivers 9 10 
19. National seashores 10 5 
20. Parks - other 11 10 
• 
.. 
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ensure that the context distinguishes the relevant category, otherwise we 
assume that it refers to any of the national park areas. 
Visits to national park areas may occur as recreation or non-recreation 
visits. The NPS defines re.creation visits as "entries of persons onto lands and 
waters administered by the NPS for recreation purposes, excluding government 
personnel, through traffic (commuters), trades-people, and persons residing 
within park boundaries" (U.S. National Park Service 1996). Our focus is on the 
recreation visits, which in reality may include educational visits by students etc. 
Data Collection and Organization 
We obtained data on recreation visits to national park areas for the years 
1993, 1994 and 1996 from the NPS's Public Use Statistics Program Center in 
Waso Denver, Colorado (U.S. National Park Service 1993, 1994, 1996). For 
each park, we obtained the geographic coordinates of its centroid from the NPS's 
Water Resources Division at Fort Collins, Colorado, and overlay it on a digital 
U.S. county and territory boundaries map using the Geographic Information 
System software, Arcview 3.0. We obtained county level total human population­
and per capita income- projections from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(1998). We created new variables from the populations and per capita incomes 
of counties within one hundred miles of each park's centroid to reflect local 
population and local per capita income respectively. 
We obtained data on the area size (acres) of each park from the Parks 
Directory of the United States (Smith 1992). We updated these data using the 
official NPS's pUblic Web-site (U.S. National Park Service 1998). We also used 
• 
these sources to calculate the total number of state and national park areas in 
each of the U.S. states and territories. Finally, we obtained data on vehicle and 
person entrance fees from the NPS's Office of Public Affairs, Washington DC. 
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Theoretical Expectations on Factors Influencing Visitation 
To determine the impact of entrance fees on visitation we analyzed two 
competing hypotheses. The first hypothesis postulated that price and other 
economic variables (regional income, national income, and regional population) 
were significant explanatory variables. This "price hypothesis" was based on the 
neoclassical expectation that those variables should impact visitation. 
Consequently, we expected visitation to show the usual negative elasticity with 
respect to price (person and vehicle entrance fees, Appendix 1, 2}. 'n addition, 
we expected visitation to increase with the personal incomes of counties near 
individual parks, and over time with national income. 
In the second hypothesis, we propose that individual park attributes were 
the primary determinants of visitation rates, and that where entrance fees 
existed, they were too low relative to income and trip expense to affect visitation. 
We refer to this as the "attribute hypothesis". 
Other factors that might affect visitation were also considered. To begin 
with, we expected larger parks to receive more visits. There are two reasons 
why this may be the case. Firstly, larger parks usually have more diverse 
attractions, which normally lure more people. Secondly, larger parks may have 
their perimeters bordering more extensive non-park areas, which should host a 
higher population of potential visitors compared to smaller parks with similar 
characteristics. More directly, we expected those parks surrounded by larger 
populations to receive more visits, the extent of their perimeter notwithstanding. 
We also expected visitation to increase with the national population over time. 
-
Some parks have attributes that are beyond the ordinary characteristics of 
most parks. The fact that Yellowstone is the world's oldest national park, the 
topography of the Grand Canyon or the nature of Hawaii's Volcanic National Park 
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are clearly beyond the ordinary. Parks with such attributes are usually well 
known, and we expected that to increase visitation. Yet, many parks may be 
close substitutes in terms of the opportunities they provide, so that nearby parks 
reduce visitation to other individual park areas (Burt and Brewer 1971, Chase 
1996). Finally, because of growing income and population, changing lifestyles, 
etc. visitation may show an upward trend with random shifts (Conrad 1997). 
The Model 
To isolate the effects of prices and other variables we used the data 
collected above to estimate a multiple regression model of the form: 
Vit = a. + 1l11nAt + [32Pl il + 133PNt + 1341nMt + [3slnPGDPt + 136Fpit + 137FVit + 13aSp 
+ [39STt + 1310Tt + E 
where: 
VII. = number of visits to park i over year t 
At = area size of park i in year t 
PUt = regional populations (in counties, 100 miles of park j's centroid) 
PNt =the nationa' population in year t 
Mil. =regional per capita incomes (in counties, 100 miles of park j's centroid) 
PGDPt = the national per capita income in year t 
Fpit =person entrance fee to park i in year t 
FVIt = vehicle entrance fee to park i in year t 
Sp = a joint dummy variable for several parks indicating well known (1) or less 
-

well known (0) parks (Appendix 1, 2) ... 
Sn = total number of competing parks (Le. number of parks in park j's state) 
Tt = a trend variable 
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The as and ps are coefficients and E is the ordinary regression error. The 
natural logs of income variables and area size were used to allow for expected 
nonlinear effects of these variables on visitation: First, larger areas are less 
dense with respect to roads and other facilities and we expected visitation to 
increase with area size but at a slower rate. Second, we assumed that the 
elasticity of visitation with respect to income declines as income rises. 
Initial examination of our data revealed that visitation had declined slightly 
over the study period (Table 2). In addition, preliminary OLS analysis revealed 
that the trend variable was highly correlated with the national population. 
Consequently, we excluded the trend variable 'from all subsequent analysis. 
Multiple collinearity leads to the exclusion of variables initially considered 
important and raises the difficult question of model specification bias, an 
occurrence we did not confirm with Ramsey's Reset Test for omitted variables. 
In contrast, the Breush-Pagan-Godfrey Test suggested heteroscedasticity in our 
data. Plots of the OLS residuals against the explanatory variables did not isolate 
the culpable variable(s). As a check on the sensitivity of the OLS results to the 
heteroscedasticity, we present White's heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics 
alongside the OLS results. Since the results from both procedures are mostly 
consistent, we base the following presentation on the OLS estimates, only 
making a note where the conclusion about an independent variable might change 
with White's method. 
We begin our analysis with parks comprising areas of biological and 
aesthetic importance, which we collectively call natural protected areas. We then 
estimate a similar model for the national historic areas and for the combined data 
-

set for all national park areas with reported visitation data. All money variables 
are in 1993 real dollars. 
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Table 2. Annual Summary of Some Relevant Variables 
Variable 1993 1994 1996 
Natural Protected Areas 
Total visits, V" (millions) 63.323 63.555 63.866 
IMean regional population, Pu (millions) 1.616 1.662 1.631 
Regional per capita income, M" $17,623 $17,444 $17,843 
National per capita income, GOPt, 
(billions) $21220 $21505 $22254 
National population PNl, (millions) 258 260 265 
Historic Areas 
Total visits, V" (millions) 36.045 35.436 34.785 
Mean regional population, Pu (millions) 6.312 6.339 6.411 
Per capita income, Mt ($) $19,348 $19,406 $20,108. 
All National Park Areas 
Total visits, Vlo (millions) 269.168 266.268 265.796 
Mean regional population, Pu (millions) 4.333 4.366 4.433 
Per capita income, Mt ($) $18,146 $18,128 $18,735 
Data for 1995 are not included in the analysis because that year's data were not available. 
-

9 
Results of the Regression Model 
Natural Protected Areas 
Among the natural protected areas, each of 5 national parks (category 11) 
formed a contiguous region with a corresponding national preserve (category 
13). We pooled the data of each of these contiguous areas and added the 
remaining 47 national parks, the remaining five national preserves, the Theodore 
Roosevelt Island, and one national reserve (category 15), so that our sample 
contains 59 natural protected areas, and 177 observations. 
In this context, park area size (coefficient 131) is significantly positive1 
(Table 3). This was expected because as mentioned above, larger parks may 
attract more people, and more so from nearby areas. Indeed, the coefficient for 
the total population in nearby counties W2) is also significant. Regional per capita 
income is not a significant explanatory variable. 
The coefficient for the person entrance fee We) is insignificant, but has the 
expected sign. That of vehicle entrance fee W7) is of the unexpected sign and 
significant. This result is puzzling. It may reflect management decisions to apply 
vehicle fees in park areas with higher than average visitation, attempting to attain 
funds for their high maintenance costs. These two results with entrance fees 
(positive, significant vehicle fee, and insignificant person fee) are inconsistent 
with the price hypothesis, but are consistent with the attribute hypothesis. 
Surprisingly, the coefficient of the joint variable for well known parks (138) is 
insignificant. This challenges the attribute hypothesis because the variable 
lumps together parks with unusual attributes. As expected, however, the 
­
...
coefficient for the number of competing parks in the state W9) is negative and 
highly significant. This is important because it suggests that. natural protected 
1 White's heteroscedasticity-consistent P1 has a t-statistic that is almost significant. 
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Table 3. Model Estimates for Natural Protected Areas 
Heteroscedasticity 
Variable Mean Coefficient Value t-value Sig. Levelconsistent t-values 
Constant a -567669 -.009 .933 -.023 
Log area, InA. (acres) 12.65 ~1 134590.85 2.377 .019 1.881 
Regional population, PL~ 
(millions) 1.636 ~2 .24 4.363 .000 2.356 
National Population, PNt 
(millions) 261 ~3 .00 .008 .994 0.110 
Log regional per capita 
income,lnM~ ($) 9.799 ~4 212064.67 .768 .444 1.121 
National per capita income, 
InPGDPl , ($) 9.983 ~5 174896.9 -.002 .998 -.010 
Person entrance fee, Fprt ($) 1.486 ~6 -21842.74 -.127 .899 -.233 
Vehicle fee, Fvrt ($) 2.645 ~7 220959.30 2.435 .016 3.883 
Well known parks dummy, Sp .103 ~8 -295569.91 -.822 .412 -1.165 
Number of competing parks, STit 114.3 ~9 -6201.38 -3.807 .000 -2.564 
-

..­
Mean visits per area per year = 1.085 million R2 = .266 
Durbin-Watson d statistic = 2.035 
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areas are economic substitutes for each other, and may also offer an explanation 
on why ~8 is not significant. Perhaps each natural protected area is on average 
special, and visitor preferences diverse enough to produce the result. Indeed, 
unusual attributes would not count if most visits were from local areas as the 
significant coefficient for the regional populations suggests. The national 
population and the national per capita income are not significant. 
Inherent in the formulation of the OLS model is the assumption that 
differences across individual units can be captured by differences in explanatory 
variables. In the face of the low R2 and an insignificant constant term, we ran a 
fixed effects model by including separate intercept terms for 58 of the fifty-nine 
natural protected areas. The variables for the natural log of area size, the joint 
dummy variable for well known parks, and the variable for competing parks in the 
state were excluded in the process due to collinearity problems associated with 
the few observations per individual park. From now on we refer to this as the 
collinearity problem (Berk 1977; Frane 1977; Efroymson, 1960). 
Of the 57 intercept terms, only four were not statistically significant. (See 
Appendix 1: The coefficients of these intercepts are not provided because they 
are not by themselves economically meaningful.) In the context of our earlier 
regression, however, they are important in three ways. Firstly. they reduce the 
importance of the regional populations and vehicle fees as explanatory variables 
(Table 4). Secondly, the fact that almost all the new intercept terms are 
significant supports the attribute hypothesis on the importance of individual park 
attributes. Thirdly, the R2 is now high at .996 with only a few condition indices 
-
suggesting multicollinearity. 
.­
Regression Results for National Historic Areas 
We now turn to areas of historic importance. We combined 67 historic 
sites (Category 5), 32 historic parks (Category 6) and the Fort McHenry National 
12 
R2 = .996 Durbin-Watson d-statistic = 1.94 
Table 4. Model Estimates for the Natural Protected Areas with Individual 
Intercepts and a Comparison of the t-5tatistics with Those of the Model 
without the Intercepts 
t statistics t statistics 
Variable Coefficient Value (with intercepts) (without intercepts) 
Constant IX 6520417.4 .118 -.009 
Regional population, PL~ P2 -0.015 -.122 4.363 
National population Nt 
(millions) P3 .005 .115 .008 
Log regional per capita 
income InM. ($) P4 -5078.121 -.162 .768 
National per capita 
income, InPGDPt P5 -528531 -.079 .002 
Person Fee, Fp~. ($) Ps -17275.591 -.512 -.127 
Vehicle fee Fv~. ($) P7 -11489.138 -.638 2.435 
• 
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Monument and Historic Site, so that this sample includes 100 historic areas, and 
300 observations. We applied the model described above to this new sample. 
The coefficient for area size. ~1. is positive and significant (Table 5). 
Although this result is similar to the one obtained for natural protected areas, it 
was unexpected because historic areas are all relatively small. Since the 
explanations of more opportunities and contact with larger non-park areas given 
for the significant ~1 in the regression for natural protected areas may not apply 
to historic areas. this result may indicate a preference for larger areas in 
individual visitation decisions. Indeed. the regional populations which should be 
higher for larger nearby non-park areas are not a significant explanatory variable 
in visits to historic areas. 
Consistent with the price hypothesis, the coefficient for the person 
entrance fees W6) is significantly negative. This is unlike the case of natural 
protected areas, and contradicts the attribute hypothesis on the unimportance of 
entrance fees. The coefficient for vehicle fee W7) is again significantly positive, 
contradicting the price hypothesis. Regional per capita incomes are again not 
significant. Unlike the case of natural protected areas, the coefficient for 
competing parks W9) is positive and significanf This suggests that the presence 
of other parks may enhance visitation to individual historic areas as with 
economic complements. The coefficient for the joint variable for well known 
historic areas We) is also positive and significant. The national income and the 
national population are both insignificant as in the model for natural protected 
areas. 
We also estimated a fixed effects model for historic areas by including 
-

intercept terms for 99 of the one hundred historic areas in the sample. As in the 
model for natural protected areas, the variable for the natura,l log of area size, the 
2 White's heteroscedasticity consistent ~9 has a t-statistic in Table 5 that is almost significant. 
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Table 5. Model Estimates for National Historic Areas 
Heteroscedasticity 
Variable Mean Coefficients Value t-value Sig. Level consistent t-values 
Constant a. 2709550.2 .096 .923 .077 
Log area, InA~ (acres) 4.85 ~1 50608.818 2.852 .005 3.293 
Regional population, PL~ 
(millions) 6.354 ~2 .009 .884 .378 .872 
National Population, PNl (millions) 261 ~3 -.004 -.181 .857 -.223 
Log regional per capita income, 
InM~ Oog $) 9.982 ~4 29696.598 .205 .838 .391 
National per capita income, 
InPGDPt ($) 9.983 ~5 -217191 -.067 .947 -.040 
Person fee, Fp~ ($) .853 ~6 -116386.3 -2.792 .006 -3.586 
Vehicle fee, Fv~ ($) .313 ~7 168081.466 4.279 .000 2.570 
Well known parks dummy, Sp .129 ~8 252513.078 2.120 .035 1.811 
Competing parks, STil 100.2 ~9 2307.441 3.084 .002 1.900 
-

R2Mean visits per area per year =356,665 = .168 
Durbin-Watson d-statistic =1.74 
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joint variable for well-known parks, and the variable for competing parks were 
excluded in the process, due to the collinearity problem. 
The effect of the individual intercept terms is similar to that observed in the 
regression for the natural protected areas. They reduce the importance of the 
previously significant coefficients, while those previously insignificant remain 
unchanged in terms of the level of significance and sign (Table 6). The R2 is also 
now high, again with a few condition indices suggesting multicollinearity. 
We observed that the significant intercept terms for individual natural 
protected areas strengthened the attribute hypothesis. The same cannot be said 
of the historic areas where only 19 out of 99 are significant. While this may 
challenge the attribute hypothesis, it may also be linked to the fact that historic 
areas behaved like economic complements, a feature that may have reduced the 
importance of individual areas separately. 
Regression Results for All National Park Areas 
We have now examined the two most important categories of national 
park areas, with no clear indication that entrance fees playa significant role in 
their visitation. Similarly, the two categories have shown mixed results regarding 
the role of individual park attributes. In this section we combined the 19 
categories of the parks that had reported visitation between 1993 and 1996 and 
re-estimated the regression model. Our sample now included 328 of the total 
376 national park areas and 984 observations. 
Consistent with the price hypothesis, and as in the regression for historic 
areas, the person entrance fee is significantly negative (Table 7). Vehicle fee 
-

and area size are again significantly positive. The regional populations are also 
significantly positive. This is as in the regression for natural protected areas, but 
it is unlike that of historic areas where the regional populations were not 
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Table 6. Model Estimates for Historic Areas with Individual Intercepts and a 
Comparison of the t-Statistics with Those of the Model without the 
Intercepts 
t statistics t statistics 
Variable Coefficients Value (with intercepts) (without intercepts) 
Constant IX -159502.9 .021 .096 
Regional population, PLtt 
(millions) ~2 .022 .969 .884 
National population, PNt (millions) ~3 -.002 -.288 -.181 
Log regional per capita income 
InMt ($) ~4 -1.497 .000 .205 
Per capita national income, 
InPGDPI ($) 135 46555.441 .053 -.067 
Person fee, Fpil ($) ~6 55235.342 .533 -2.792 
Vehicle fee, Fvtt ($) 137 5623.944 .222 4.279 
..
 
Durbin-Watson d-statistic = 2.001 
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Table 7. Model Estimates for All National Park Areas 
Heteroscedasticity 
Variable Mean Coefficient Value t-value Sig. Level consistent t-values 
Constant ex. -7718905 -.023 .981 .041 
Log area, InAt Oog acres) 7.794 ~1 155868.532 8.756 .000 6.154 
Regional population, Plrt (millions) 4.346 ~2 .096 5.883 .000 5.842 
National population, PNt (millions) 261 ~3 -.011 -.041 .967 .008 
Log regional per capita income, 
InMt ($) 9.808 ~4 56112.826 .243 .808 .437 
National per capita income, 
InPGDpt ($) 9.983 ~5 925992.130 .023 .891 -.041 
Per fee, Fprt ($) .904 ~6 -232457.446 -3.399 .001 -5.840 
Vehicle fee, Fvrt ($) .980 ~7 112782.828 2.660 .008 3.933 
Well known parks dummy, Sp .086 Pe 547579.295 2.735 .006 3.301 
Competing parks STij 96.89 P9 -581.385 -.650 .516 -.492 
Mean visits per area per year = 830,571.66 
Durbin-Watson d-statistic = 2.030 
-
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significant. Regional per capita incomes are again not a significant explanatory 
variable. The joint variable for well-known parks is significant as in the case of 
historic areas, while the total competing parks are now insignificant. The national 
income and the national population are also insignificant. 
We also estimated a fixed effects model for all parks by including intercept 
terms for 327 of the 328 national park areas. The coefficients of the intercept 
terms are again not included, because they are by themselves not economically 
meaningful. As with the prior analyses, however, they reduced the importance of 
all previously significant variables (Table 8). In addition, 284 out of 321 individual 
area intercepts are significant, reinforcing the attribute hypothesis. The natural 
log of area size, the joint variable for well-known parks, and the variable for 
competing parks were again excluded due to the collinearity problem. 
Summary and Conclusions 
We estimated OLS models for 3 years of visits to: 1) 56 natural protected 
areas; 2) 100 national historic areas; and 3) a combined data set of 19 categories 
of national park areas with a total of 328 areas and 984 observations. The 
analysis was carried out under the premise that entrance fees, and other socio­
economic variables were significant explanatory variables. This "price 
hypothesis" was based on the neo-classical expectation that those variables 
should significantly impact visitation. We also analyzed an alternative "attribute 
hypothesis" which postulated that individual park attributes were the primary 
determinants of visitation rates, and that where entrance fees existed, they were 
too low relative to income and trip expense to affect visitation. • 
We began our analysis with the data set including natural protected areas. 
The results from the initial model suggested the unimportance of economic 
variables including entrance fees, regional per capita incomes and national 
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Table 8. Model Estimates for All National Park Areas with Individual 
Intercepts and a Comparison of their t-Statistics with Those of the Model 
without the Intercepts 
t-value t-value 
Variable Coefficient Value (with intercept) (without intercept) 
Constant a. -1091344 -.260 -.023 
Regional population, PL~ (millions) ~2 -.04 -.576 5.883 
National Population, PN, (millions) ~3 -.01 -.352 -.041 
log regional per capita income, 
InMi ($) ~4 -3018.25 -.073 .243 
National per capita income, 
InPGDpt ($) ~5 164105 .324 .023 
Person entrance fee, Fp~ ($) ~6 -7159.67 -.153 -3.399 
Vehicle fee, FVit ($) ~7 1836.31 .106 2.66 
-

R2 = .991 Durbin-Watson d-statistic = 2.088 
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income, supporting the attribute hypothesis. Separate OLS regressions for 
national historic areas and for the combined data set suggested the importance 
of individual park attributes by returning a significant coefficient for a joint variable 
for well known parks. These regressions also returned negatively significant 
coefficients for the person entrance fee, meaning that the price hypothesis could 
not be rejected. 
A fixed effects version of the OLS model had individual park intercept 
terms reduce the importance of the significant coefficients from the initial model 
in the three cases considered. These intercept terms were almost always 
significant in the model for visits to natural protected areas, and to all the parks 
together, further supporting the attribute hypothesis on the importance of 
individual park attributes. In contrast, individual intercept terms for historic areas 
were mostly insignificant. Although this appears to contradict the attribute 
hypothesis, it may also be due to complementary effects of the individual historic 
areas, a feature that can render them less important individually. Indeed, the 
joint variable for well known parks, which lumps together areas with unusual 
attributes, was significant for visits to historic areas. This variable was also 
significant for visits to all the parks together in the initial model. 
Multicollinearity among our explanatory variables raises some difficult 
questions of interpretation. Statistically, it may leave the variance of the 
estimating equation without serious bias. However, it can increase the standard 
error of individual coefficients, thereby reducing the t-statistics of the estimated 
coefficients (Gujarati 1994). In the context of this work then, it is not possible to 
conclude that variables with insignificant t-statistics are unimportant. We may 
-

conclude, however, that significant coefficients with the expected signs are 
important. 
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In the context of these results, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
importance of individual park attributes in visitation have been confirmed. With 
respect to the entrance fees, however, their importance has been suggested but 
not unequivocally. In addition, the significantly positive coefficient for vehicle fee 
across the three data sets in the initial model may reflect management decisions 
to apply vehicle fees in park areas with higher than average visitation, attempting 
to attain funds for their high maintenance costs. The extent that this may actually 
happen is, however, unclear given that entrance fees are still mostly under 
Congressional control. 
Since our results are inconclusive about the role of entrance fees, we 
have not estimated elasticities of visitation, nor have we calculated the 
consumers' value or consumers' surplus for national park areas. 
The results from the OLS model also allowed us to draw conclusions on 
some other variables. First, the coefficient for the number of competing parks 
was significantly negative for natural protected areas, but significantly positive for 
historic areas. From this we may conclude that natural protected areas are 
economic substitutes, and that historic areas are economic complements. 
Second, the number of competing parks was not a significant explanatory 
variable for all the parks together, perhaps reflecting the mixed effects of both 
complements and substitutes among the different categories of national park 
areas. Finally, the consistently significant coefficient for log area suggests 
individual preference for larger areas in visitation decisions. 
Policy implications 
­
These results have policy implications because the National Park Service 
(NPS) has often argued, as in the attribute hypothesis, that entrance fees have 
been too low to affect visitation (U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural 
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Resources 1979, 1987 pages 34-36 and 49-49, 1997). The service has used the 
argument in its requests to Congress for more authority in the design of the 
entrance fee program. Under the Fee Demonstration Program described earlier, 
the NPS has substantially increased entrance fees to many parks. Initial visitor 
reaction to the new fees has been mixed (Lundgren et. al. 1997; Lundgren and 
Lime 1997). Although our results are inconclusive with respect to the role of 
entrance fees, we speculate that much higher fees would significantly affect park 
visitation levels, and the NPS, the Congress and the general public may need to 
consider this in the debat.e on entrance fees. 
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APPENDIX 1 
National Protected Areas: Parks (NP) Preserves (NPPRES) and Reserve used in 
the Model 
Protected Area 
Vehicle Fee M 
Person Fee (P) 
Well known Parks (Sp) 
Yes (1), No (0) 
Individual Park 
Intercept t - values 
1. Acadia NP VIP 0 2.934 
2. Arches NP VIP 0 -7.308 
3. Badlands NP VIP 0 -13.151 
4. Big Bend NP VIP 0 -21.397 
5. Big Cypress NPRES V 0 -5.819 
6. Big Thicket NPRES none 0 -8.722 
7. Biscayne NP none 0 -14.441 
8. Bryce Canyon NP VIP 0 -8.598 
9. Canyonlands NP VIP 0 -15.034 
10. Capitol Reef NP VIP 0 -11.394 
11. Carlsbad Caverns NP none 0 -11.601 
12. Channel Islands NP none 0 -1.534 
13. City of Rocks National Reserve none 0 -14.965 
14. Crater Lake NP VIP 0 -20.131 
15. Death Valley NP VIP 0 -3.320 
16. Denali NP and NPRES P 0 -16.615 
17. Dry Tortugas NP none 0 -14.782 
18. Everglades NP VIP 1 -12.903 
19. Gates of the Arctic NP & NPRES none 0 -14.888 
20. Glacier Bay NP and NPRES P 0 -14.590 
21. Glacier NP V 0 -3.7456 
22. Grand Canyon NP VIP 1 12.047 
23. Grand Teton NP VIP 0 2.122 
24. Great Basin NP none 0 -14.887 
25. Great Smoky Mountains NP none 0 12.397 
26. Guadalupe Mountains NP none 0 -14.007 
27. Haleakala NP VIP 0 -8.662 
28. Hawaii Volcanoes NP VIP 1 -10.198 
29. Hot Springs NP none 0 -4.065 
30. Isle Royale NP none 0 -14.974 
31. Joshua Tree NP VIP 0 -1.660 
32. Kenai Fjords NP none 0 -14.019 
33. Kings Canyon NP VIP 0 -7.320 
34. Kobuk Valley NP none 0 -14.893 
35. Lake Clark NP and NPRES none 0 -15.078 
36. Lassen Volcanic NP VIP 0 -15.639 
37. Mammoth Cave NP none 0 -0.875 
38. Mesa Verde NP VIP 0 -7.851 
39. Mount Rainier NP VIP 0 -3.330 
40. Noatak NPRES none 0 -14.838 
41. North Cascades NP none 0 -7.122 
42. Olympic NP VIP 0 2.320 
•
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43. Petrified Forest NP VIP 0 -11.451 
44. Redwood NP none 0 -12.447 
45. Rocky Mountain NP VIP 0 3.300 
46. Saguaro NP VIP 0 -3.903 
47. Sequoia NP VIP 0 -3.197 
48. Shenandoah NP VIP 0 -1.152 
49. Theodore Roosevelt Island none 1 -2.456 
50. Theodore Roosevelt NP VIP 1 -18.528 
51. Timucuan Ecological & Hist. Preserve none 0 -3.575 
52. Voyageurs NP none 0 -13.622 
53. Wind Cave NP none 0 -10.748 
54. Wrangell-St. Elias NP and NPRES none 0 -14.628 
55. Yellowstone NP VIP 1 4.760 
56. Yosemite NP VIP 1 3.488 
57. Yukon Charley Rivers NPRES none 0 -15.109 
58. Zion NP VIP 0 Base 
Note: The SP variable here was used in the regression reported in Table 3. The t-statistics for 
individual area intercepts are from the regression summarized in Table 4. The Virgin Islands NP 
was not included in the analysis because of missing data. 
,. 
-
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APPENDIX.2 
National Historic Areas: Historic Sites (NHS) and Parks (NHP) used in the Model 
Protected Area 
Vehicle Fee M 
Person Fee (P) 
Well known Parks (Sp): 
Yes (1), No (0) 
Individual Park 
Intercept t - values 
1.. Abraham Uncoln NHS none 1 1.746 
2.. Adams NHS P 0 -0.492 
3.. Allegheny Portage Railroad NHS none 0 1.009 
4.. Andersonville NHS none 0 1.170 
5.. Andrew Johnson NHS none 0 0.154 
6. Appomattox Court House NHP P 0 0.561 
7. Bent's Old Fort NHS P 0 0.145 
8. Boston African-American NHS none 0 2.399 
9. Boston NHP none 0 14.708 
10. Carl Sandburg Home NHS P 0 -0.126 
11. Chaco Culture NHP VIP 0 0.180 
12. Charles Pinckney NHS none 0 0.497 
13. Chesapeake and Ohio Canal NHP VIP 0 6.324 
14. Clara Barton NHS none 0 -0.196 
15. Colonial NHP VIP 0 8.735 
16. Craters of the Moon NMON none 0 5.283 
17. Dayton Aviation NHP none 1 0.142 
18. Edgar Allan Poe NHS none 0 -1.007 
19. Edison NHS P 0 -1.693 
20. Eisenhower NHS P 0 -0.250 
21. Eleanor Roosevelt NHS none 0 -0.702 
22. Eugene O'Neil NHS none 0 -0.581 
23. Ford's Theater NHS none 0 6.655 
24. Fort Bowie NHS none 0 0.502 
25. Fort Davis NHS P 0 0.226 
26. Fort Laramie NHS P 0 0.262 
27. Fort Lamed NHS P 0 0.164 
26. Fort McHenry NMON P 0 1.825 
29. Fort Point NHS none 0 10.495 
30. Fort Raleigh NHS none 0 1.879 
31. Fort Scott NHS P 0 0.091 
32. Fort Smith NHS P 0 0.221 
33. Fort Union Trading Post NHS none 0 0.637 
34. Fort Vancouver NHS P 0 0.863 
35. Frederick Douglas NHS none 0 0.227 
36. Frederick Law Olmsted NHS none 0 -0.493 
37. Friendship Hill NHS none 0 0.034 
38. George Rogers Clark NHP P 1 0.367 
39. Golden Spike NHS VIP 0 0.142 
40. Grant-Kohrs Ranch NHS P 0 0.129 
41. Hampton NHS none 0 -0.312 
42. Harpers Ferry NHP VIP 0 0.513 
..
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